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Introduction
This position paper uses the methodology in Design for Success (Rouse, 1991) as a basis for a
human factors certification program. The Design for Success (DFS) methodology espouses a
multi-step process to designing and developing systems in a human-centered fashion. These
steps are as follows:
• Naturalizing - Understand stakeholders and their concerns.
• Marketing - Understand market-oriented alternatives to meeting stakeholder concerns.
• Engineering - Detailed design and development of the system considering tradeoffs
between technology, cost, schedule, certification requirements, etc.
• System Evaluation - Determining if the system meets its goal(s).
• Sales and Service - Delivering and maintaining the system.
Because the main topic of this paper is certification, we will focus our attention on step 4,
System Evaluation, since it is the natural precursor to certification. Evaluation involves testing
the system and its parts for their correct behaviors. Certification focuses not only on ensuring
that the system exhibits the correct behaviors, but only the correct behaviors. Before we delve
into evaluation and certification issues, however, some brief explanations of the other key DFS
steps are necessary to put the system evaluation step and the subsequent certification step
(outlined herein) in context with the overall methodology.
Naturalizing
The main purpose for naturalizing is to understand the purpose of the system to be certified and
to understand the concerns of the various system stakeholders. From a human-centered
perspective, the system's purpose should be described in a way that explains why and how the
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system supports the human operator in accomplishing his or her goals. For example, if we
define the airline pilot's job as safely and efficiently moving passengers from origin to
destination, then the purpose of the airliner and all its parts are to support the pilot. (By "parts"
we mean electric, hydraulic and engine subsystems; flight management and other software
modules; and, individual components such as radios, circuit breakers, throttle levers and
switches.) Note that we are not stating that the pilot's job is to fly the airplane. Nor are we
stating that the airplane transports people.
Rather, the emphasis is on the human, the pilot, whose job it is to transport passengers by
using the airplane. The subtle distinction of such a statement of system purpose is a key to
thoroughly understanding and properly executing human-centered design, development and
certification of aviation systems. This distinction becomes clearer with practice and is at the
heart of naturalizing.
Defining the system's purpose requires understanding the history of the domain and the
environment in which the to-be-certified system is to operate. Questions for identifying these
issues include:
• Is this a new system or upgrade?
• If new, what was done previously? Why?
• What is the purpose of the system? (Answers should be stated in a human-centered
format, as in the above airplane's purpose.)
• What problems are there with the existing system?
(Note: If the system is completely new (no predecessor), the risk is too great and the system
is not suitable for certification.)
The reasons for asking these questions are to understand the system's purpose and
operational goals, and to begin defining the set of measurements for evaluation and
certification. Other measurement issues surface during discussions with stakeholders which
must be recorded for use during the evaluation step. Typical stakeholders and their concerns are
described next.
Stakeholder Concerns
Before the system stakeholder concerns can be addressed, the various stakeholders must first
be identified. Typically system stakeholders are designers, developers, users, maintainers,
purchasers, and certifiers of the system. Groups of stakeholders as well as individuals should
be identified so that questionnaires can be devised and interviews can be scheduled. It is
important to pay special attention to groups or individuals knowledgeable in the current
certification processes of similar systems, since the emphasis of this paper is on certification.
Questions asked of stakeholders include:
• What is the purpose of the system from your perspective?
• What behaviors are expected during normal operations?
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• Whatbehaviorsareexpectedduringabnormal(degradedsystem)situations?
• Whataretheexpectedrolesofthehumanoperatorinbothoftheaboveconditions?
Thepurposeforaskingthesequestionsistounderstandthevarioustakeholderconcernsso
thathecertificationcanproceedalongawell-definedpath;afterall,typicalcertificationbudget
andscheduler sourcesarelimited.Thiswell-definedpathisderivedfromthemeasurement
issuesidentifiedduringthisnaturalistphase;therefore,stakeholderconcernsmustbeexpressed
inquantifiableandmeasurableterms.Thesestakeholder-definedmetricsthencombinewiththe
systemetrics(definedearlier)toformthesetofmeasurementissueswhicharethebasisof
systemevaluationa dcertification.
Thestakeholdersshouldhaverepresentativesonthatcertificationteamwhichactually
conductsthesystemevaluation.Thisteamconceptensuresthatall relevantstakeholder
concernsareproperlyaddressedduringtheevaluationandcertificationprocess.System
evaluationisthesubjectofthenextsection.
System Evaluation
The first step in system evaluation is to define human-centered metrics based upon the system's
goals and purpose, and based upon the stakeholders' concerns gathered during naturalizing.
Human-centered measurements are those that evaluate system performance and behavior from
the human operator's perspective. For example, a software function may be able to execute in
five milliseconds; but the system operator may only be able to comprehend that function's
outputs at a 1Hz rate. There is no reason to test that software function at an execution speed
faster than 1Hz (from a human-centered certification standpoint; however, other system
engineering reasons may exist for testing that function at the 200Hz. rate).
Quantifiable metrics must be defined not only for the whole system, but for subsystems,
modules, and components in order to evaluate their performance and behavior as the system is
constructed. While the certification authority is concerned with the system-level performance
and behavior of the completed system, it is important that the certification team have confidence
in the underlying parts of the system. Therefore, this team should have access to developmental
testing metrics, methods and results; additionally, they should independently verify a subset of
those earlier tests.
Also, for human-centered certification purposes, the parts of the system should be evaluated
as they interact to form operator-observable behaviors. These threads of interaction allow an
operator representative on the certification team to focus on specific behaviors under specific
circumstances - something that is difficult to do when evaluating the entire system because
repeatable conditions are harder to generate as the system grows in complexity.
Another consideration for the certification team is to evaluate subjective as well as objective
metrics. Subjective metrics include those that measure operator performance, workload,
situational awareness, tendencies to commit errors (due to memory overload, operational
stresses, mode confusion, a faulty mental model of the system, etc.), and the appropriate task
mixes between automation and the operator.
Methods for objective and subjective evaluation are presented in the next sub-section.
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Evaluation Methodology
The guiding principle for system evaluation is to test the system and its parts in such a manner
as to yield results that can be compared against the metrics determined earlier. Analyses and
evaluation methods include:
• Paper and pencil (mathematical) analyses
• Modeling of the system and/or its parts from a human-centered view
• Operator-in-the-loop experiments for even greater fidelity.
Each method is further discussed below, amplified with examples from our experiences
Mathematical Analyses. An envisioned airport safety system is being designed to detect and
help prevent runway incursions and have minimal false alarms (a typical engineering trade-off
between increasing system sensitivity and minimizing false alarms). Airport tower controllers
are also responsible for detecting and preventing runway incursions (among their many other
duties), so we performed a signal detection comparison between the automation's specified
detection performance and the historical controller detection performance. Since runway
incursions happen so infrequently, and since controllers detect and act to prevent most
impending runway incursion accidents, we wanted to know if an automated runway incursion
prevention system would boost the overall detection and prevention of incursions.
Using a statistical distribution analysis, we found that the automated safety system is not
likely to improve the overall detection and prevention of runway incursions. This result is
mainly due to the fact that controllers are already very good detectors of impending incursions,
and so their signal detection performance distribution vastly dominates the specified signal
detection performance of the automated system. Obviously, we made some very broad
assumptions, but even with this fairly inexpensive evaluation method, we were able to
recommend that the automated system's detection rate should be somewhat modified. Another
recommendation was to further analyze the result using higher fidelity analysis methods, such
as modeling, which is described next.
Modeling. Modeling is useful for testing hypotheses about the real system under conditions that
the real system cannot be exposed to - for cost, safety or other reasons. Digital models also
allow for testing system behaviors in faster-than-real-time, thus enabling many replications
under specified conditions which can yield statistically significant results.
For example, we developed a digital simulation of Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport
to test hypotheses about the effects of various features of the airport automation system
described above. While there were many simplifying assumptions needed to develop a model of
this complex environment in a reasonable amount of time, we were able to make some
recommendations about controller communication workload under varying conditions. We
could never have done such an analysis on the real system because it would have interfered
with airport operations. Plus, we ran the model for replications of 40 simulated days in just a
few minutes which enabled us to quickly obtain statistically significant results.
Another benefit to system modeling is that analytical results help fine-tune higher fidelity
analyses such as simulation studies (described next), thus making these more expensive
evaluation methods more cost effective.
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Simulation Experiments. System simulations are the next step increase in fidelity over digital
modeling. Simulation experiments with real system operators participating are useful when
human operator interactions are required to evaluate the system (or some part of it) and yet the
real system cannot be used because it does not exist yet, or because safety, cost or operational
reasons preclude using the actual system.
For example, we were involved in the design, development and evaluation of the Pilot's
Associate (PA), an electronic copilot for a next-generation single-seat tactical fighter. A
simulation of the fighter's cockpit was needed to conduct utility testing of PA. This testing
compared PA and non-PA conditions and used metrics ranging from fuel consumption to kill
ratios to situational awareness. A method chosen for evaluating this range of metrics was pilot-
in-the-loop simulation experiments because pilot opinion and performance comparisons were of
vital importance to many of PA's stakeholders (Cody, 1992). (Incidentally, the PA program
also used digital models to focus the piloted simulation experiments on the metrics and
conditions where the greatest performance differences were expected.) While operator-in-the-
loop simulation experiments have greater costs than the previous evaluation methods, their
credibility is also greater. It is usually the case that higher fidelity (more expensive) evaluation
methods are also more credible; but, that does not usually detract from the conclusions reached
by the less expensive methods.
Methodology Summary
The goals for system evaluation are to analyze the system's performance (and all earlier
intermediate results) relative to the set of metrics defined during naturalizing, and then to
formulate conclusions and recommendations for system modification. In accomplishing these
goals, the evaluation team must define follow-up analyses and tests where performance results
do not meet expectations. The team also determines if new metrics are needed. If so, they refine
metrics, as appropriate, then conduct additional analyses and tests, and iterate as needed until all
metrics are satisfied.
As the system is being designed, developed and produced, the evaluation team should be the
system's designers and developers. Test results are then made available to the final evaluation
team. It is important to emphasize that each analysis method helps define the higher fidelity
evaluations. That is, the results from each method must be analyzed relative to previously-
defined metrics, and they must be used to refine any subsequent evaluation methods, or the
next iterations of previous methods. A human-centered evaluation and certification process is
necessarily iterative.
Now that we have described system evaluation, we shall next highlight the distinctions
between it and certification.
Certification Issues
While certification can be described as a more formalized evaluation process, it is distinct from
the evaluation process described above in that it must independently analyze the system. This
independent analysis can be very structured in the sense that different systems or components
have to pass differing levels of scrutiny during certification.
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Forexample,theRTCA(RequirementsandTechnicalConceptsforAviation,anindustry
groupthatdevisesstandardsforaviationsystems)advocatesdifferentcategoriesforcertifyinga
systemanditspans.Thecategoriesarebaseduponthecriticalityoffailureconditions,namely:
• "Catastrophic- Failureconditionswhichwouldpreventcontinuedsafeflightand
landing"
• Hazardous- Failureconditionswhichreducesafetymargins,causephysicaldistress
and such high air crew workload that tasks may not be completed accurately
• Major - Failure conditions which increase crew workload thereby impairing crew
efficiency
• Minor - Failure conditions which slightly increase crew workload
• "No effect -- Failure conditions which do not affect the operational capability of the
aircraft or increase pilot workload" (Struck, 1992, page 5)
These categories can serve to guide the human-centered certification process, described next.
Certification Process
How should a human-centered certification be conducted? The RTCA seems to emphasize crew
workload levels in its definitions, and so should a human-centered certification methodology.
Of course, workload levels are not the only human-centered measure. A certification team must
also address the following concerns:
• What are the error conditions and the likelihood of the human operators committing
those errors?
• What are the normal and abnormal operator procedures, and their likelihood of being
performed correctly under varying conditions?
• What training is required for the system operators and maintainers?
• What screening for skills and physical or physiological attributes is required?
What is the tendency for the system's human-machine interface to promote the
development of accurate mental models by operators in typical operational
environments?
Answering these questions is a non-trivial exercise, but the methodology for answering
them is similar to the evaluation methodology described earlier. The gist of the distinctions
between evaluation and certification is that certification ought to analyze failure conditions and
their consequences, whereas evaluation examines correct or expected system behaviors.
Other differences between evaluation and certification relate to rules of development that are
designed to minimize the system's dynamic response to conditions. Certifiable systems should
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nothaveunpredictablefailureconditions.Forexample,whenwebuiltacertifiableknowledge
basedevelopmenttool,wehadtopayspecialttentiontosomespecificsoftwareengineering
issues,including:
• Pointers- Introducethepotentialfor directingsoftwarexecutionto placesin
computermemorythatmaynotbeavailablefornormalcomputations.
• Dynamicmemoryallocation- Introducesthepotentialforallocatingmemorythatis
alreadybeingusedforotherpurposes.
• Compilers- Thecompilerusedfordevelopmentmus be the same as that used for
creating the actual executable code and for certification. The effect of this rule is that it
inhibits the use of software development environments that typically have debuggers or
other enhancements that enable more efficient software development, but that also
greatly increase the amount of executable code loaded into a mission computer, for
example. Consequently, a sparse environment must be used for development, which is
bad for software development efficiency, or two compilers must be used - one for
development and one for pre-certification compilation - an expensive proposition
(Hammer, Skidmore & Rouse, 1993).
Another major difference between evaluation and certification is the composition of the
certification team. As mentioned earlier, the evaluation team should initially be the system's
designers and developers. The human-centered certification team must be independent,
although it should examine the metrics, tests and analyses used by the evaluation team to ensure
that the metrics are suitable and provide complete coverage for the entire system and its parts.
Certification Team Composition
One last set of questions in this paper concerns the composition of the human factors
ceaification team:
• Do the members of this team need to be certified in the human-centered certification of
systems?
• If so, what should be done to determine the certification team member's qualifications?
In order to answer all the previous questions during the certification process, the
certification team must be competent in a wide range of human-centered issues. In fact, we
think that the certification team members should be certified by the certification authority in
accordance with some professional standards and formal training (the training curriculum also
requires certification then). Determining a person's or group's competency in human-centered
system design was one project's task that we recently accomplished. We devised a set of
questions whose answers could be weighed and scored according to the needs of the system's
stakeholders (we also recommended scoring guidelines). While the questions are too numerous
to present here, they are based on the decomposition of human-centered system design
competencies into four major topics and twenty specific issues (Figure 1). A human-centered
certification team should have individuals competent in, and certified for, evaluating a system in
132 Small & Rouse
terms of the specific issues enumerated in Figure 1. A team approach seems necessary because
there are too many issues for one individual to be responsible for during the certification
process.
1.0 Understanding of
& Commitment to
Basic Philosophy "-'-'-'-'-,-,----,_
2.0 Role & Practice o_..._
/ / Measurement _
Competence' in//-
Design 3.0 Human-Centered _
Human-Centered
Design Factors &
Practices
4.0 Phenomena in
Human-Machine
Interactions
1.1 Role of human in systems
1.2 User acceptance issues
1.3 Stakeholders & buying influences
1.4 Technology transfer
2.1 Framework for measurement
2.2 Relations between measurement,
design and system usage
2.3 Stakeholder identification
2.4 Naturalist & marketing methods
2.5 Evaluation methods
3.1 Equipment design
3.2 Job design
3.3 Aiding & decision support
3.4 Training system design
3.5 Training/aiding tradeoffs
4.1 Human performance
4.2 Reasoning & decision-making
4.3 Learning & retention
4.4 Human error
4.5 Effects of automation
4.6 Workload & performance
Rgure 1. Competencies in human-centered system design (after Cody, 1993, page C-3)
Conclusion
As implied by the RTCA categories listed earlier, not every system or component should be
certified to the same level. The extent of certification should relate to the component's or
system's safety criticality. The extent of human factors certification should relate to the
component's or system's level of interaction with the human operator. Criticality and level of
interaction also affect which system stakeholders and issues require the most focus for the
certification process, which brings us back full circle to our initial naturalizing step and the
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analysis of stakeholder concerns. Typical human-centered stakeholder concerns are reflected in
the topics and issues contained in our list of human-centered system design competencies.
It is important to remember that human-centered issues comprise only one set of issues
among the many that must be considered when certifying aviation systems. From our
perspective though, the human-centered issues are the most important because if the human
cannot safely and effectively operate the system, all the other issues may be rendered irrelevant;
and, by considering the human-centered issues, all the other critical issues are likely to be
considered due to the up-front stakeholder analysis.
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